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4 Power Battle The American open-door policy results in a Chinese-US alliance against a Spanish/Japanese alliance, for a hypothetical naval action whose main virtue is that I have ships for all 4 navies. Go to the home page/4 Power Alliance for a detailed order of battle. The Chinese/American force under the usually victorious Admiral Stein divided into three columns: the US monitors and weaker cruisers under the fleet admiral himself, the faster and better but still weak US cruisers under Admiral Josh, and the surprisingly powerful ships of the Chinese Navy under Admiral Dubray. The heavy ships, theoretically the key to the battle, consisted of the 2 Chinese BBs and the 2 US monitors. (Actually one of the monitors was rather weak to truly constitute a heavy unit, but the morale effect was still there.) The Spanish force under Admiral Adamec divided into four groups: the fleet admiral commanding the two tricky "one big gun" Japanese cruisers supported by two tiny Spanish CCs, Admiral Murphy commanding the fast but mostly unarmored Japanese cruisers, and Admiral Mulligan commanding one column of three Spanish ACs and another of two Spanish BBs. The real strength of the force was the five ships under Mulligan, the only ships with reasonable armor and good guns. Admiral Stein's columns all advanced from the north board edge at full speed directly towards the enemy, as is his usual tactic. Admiral Adamec's fleet entering from the southern board edge moved southeast and looked to be maneuvering to flank the opposing fleet. However, something apparently went wrong and Adamec's line, the furthest to the west, ended up facing the faster US cruisers and the Chinese fleet at close range. So close, in fact, that a freak ram/collision occurred with the lead Chinese battleship running down and sinking one of the tiny Spanish cruisers. Admiral Murphy's group, which some commentators say was intended to be in support of Admiral Adamec, was instead far to the east, partially screened by the Spanish battleships. Admirers of Admiral Murphy, on the other hand, state that he was following orders and was exactly where he was commanded to be. Meanwhile the column of monitors, as is generally the case, was trying desperately at full speed to catch up and join the battle. Long- range firingwas not even possible, as the monitors' view of the enemy fleet was blocked by the faster Chinese column. Admiral Stein therefore turned and steamed southeast, with the unfortunate effect that he ran through the tail of the Chinese column and into the two remaining Japanese cruisers commanded by Admiral Adamec. In a tragic accident, the USS Petrel inadvertently rammed a Japanese cruiser -- some pieces of the unfortunate gunboat embedded in the hull-belt of the much heavier cruiser, the remainder sinking beneath the waves. Critics of Admiral Stein see this maneuver as an incompetent error, which but for fortune could have led to the destruction of one or both monitors as well as a Chinese cruiser. Admirers describe it as a bold stroke, a gamble which contributed to the demoralization of the enemy fleet as the dreaded - some say invincible - monitors entered the fray. At this juncture, gunfire had disabled or sunk a number of the lighter ships involved. Admiral Murphy's tail-end ship had been picked off by the Chinese, and Admiral Adamec's entire four-ship column had been destroyed. Despite the desperate entreaties of his crew, Admiral Adamec bound himself to the remnants of his flagships bridge and went down with the ship, an inspiration to future Japanese commanders. The US had effectively lost its three lightest units, with one gunboat sunk and two small cruisers immobilized and burning. Some naval analysts argue that the losses up to this point were almost irrelevant as the big ships on each side remained fully functional. The smaller ships were in any case of very limited value against ACs and BBs, and he US's loss of three against the Japanese/Spanish loss of five was a net difference of only two light ships, a trivial and far from decisive difference. However it is all too easy to forget the impact of morale in deciding battles. At this point Admiral Murphy noted that the Spanish/Japanese fleet was faster than the opposing fleet, and the surviving ships were positioned in such a way as to easily disengage. It is worth remembering from the standpoint of morale that one Japanese column, one-fourth of the fleet, had just been annihilated with the fleet admiral going down with the flagship. Admiral Murphy was no doubt aware that his ships, including his flagship, were as lightly protected as those which had just been destroyed. And it is easy to see that without his Japanese allies Admiral Mulligan would have had little enthusiasm for continuing the fight alone. Thus, with Admiral Murphy energetically leading the way, the Spanish/Japanese fleet fled for port. As far as points are concerned, the US/China fleet sank five ships worth 24 points, for the loss of two USN ships worth 4 points. (One damaged CC sunk under tow after the battle; the other made it back to port.) In addition, they established a clear morale ascendancy over their Spanish/Japanese opponents. Immediately following the battle, debate erupted between supporters of the two Japanese admirals. Was Admiral Murphy at fault for failing to support Admiral Adamec? What exactly were his orders? Was he a cowardly poltroon who hid from the enemy and fled at the first opportunity, or a talented subordinate who loyally followed orders and, with the death of the fleet admiral, saved his side from annihilation? Some commentators noted the perfect coordination between Admirals Dubray and Josh, neatly trapping Admiral Adamec's cruisers between them early in the game. Analysis of signals records, however, suggest this was more a matter of luck than coordination. Still, it is often the lucky commanders who win battles. In this writer's opinion the result in this battle was due to the command morale failure on the losing side. All the big gun ships on both sides were fully operational. The Spanish big ships in the next turn could have traded close range fire with the two monitors while the Chinese battleships were out of position some distance away. At close range the Spanish big guns penetrate all positions on the monitors except for the #6 spot on one ship. The Spanish ships resist most of the monitors' guns on two of six locations, better for the Pelayo. It would have been eleven big Spanish guns versus eight for the monitors, five ships against two. One of every three hits against the monitors would disable a big gun turret, while the Spanish big gun armor could not be penetrated except by the two best monitor guns. Clearly an exchange of gunfire would heavily favor the Spanish. One round of battle resulting in two crippled monitors would have turned the game around, giving the Spanish an edge on winning the battle. Perhaps a more Nelsonian command could have lead to decisive victory instead of ignominious rout.
Spanish-American War as run and reported by Jason Van Tassell As it stands the campaign didn't last too long.
Final Results: Spanish-American War The Spanish earned 19 victory points due to the purchase of additional US ships, 20 points due to successful shore bombardment and blowing up the Statue of Liberty, and 3 points for sinking the DC Vesuvious, for a total of 42 points. The US earned 52 points for ships and upgrades for the Spanish Atlantic fleet, 12 points for upgrades and mines for the Spanish Manila squadron, 13 points for sinking the Manila squadron, and 78 points for sinking 2 BBs, 3 ACs, and 3 TBDs, for a total of 155 points. Subtracting the 42 Spanish VPs gives an adjusted total of 113 points, an off the chart crushing victory for the United States Navy. Battle of Santiago This was the last battle of our Spanish American campaign. The Spanish were forced to come out of port single file. They led with the BB Pelayo, followed by the BB Carlos and a line of six armoured cruisers. Admiral Haggett commanded the BBs, Admiral Adamec the ACs. In our game the harbor exit was due south. The US fleet was disposed in three groups. Directly south 35" were the three US BBs commanded by Admiral Stein, to the Southwest was Admiral Marli commanding two Monitors, and to the Northwest was Admiral Mulligan commanding the Coastal BB Texas with one Monitor. The Spanish plan was to sacrifice the BBs so as to allow the escape of the ACs back to Spain. Therefore the two BBs went directly south and engaged in a close range battle with the US BBs and were fairly speedily beaten up. The ACs exited port and sharply turned left, racing eastward to the edge of the map parallel to the Cuban coastline. The Texas and Amphitrite gallantly tried to stop the escape, only for the Texas to be reduced to a burning wreck above the waterline and the Amphitrite to suffer hull damage and immobilization. The Monitors to the west crawled east as fast as possible, tossing off a few long range shots, and eventually closing on the by then immobile and burning BB Carlos to finish it off. I would rate this battle as an American material victory, with two Spanish BBs and one AC sunk, compared to zero US ships lost. However I would rate it as a Spanish morale victory as they escaped with their most modern ships. In Spain Admiral Haggett is remembered as a national martyr, while Admiral Adamec continued to command the Spanish Navy in peacetime using his prestige as a naval hero to much improve the efficiency of Spanish Naval forces. In the USA Admiral Stein was lionized by the Hearst papers, but severly criticized in certain other papers including the NY Times. Critics say that he missed a chance for a battle of annihilation which would have gone down in naval history. Some say his deployment was defective in that he left the wing squadrons too weak and that his BBs should have been split three ways rather than concentrated in one squadron. This critics instead praise Admiral Mulligan as the true hero of the battle, heroically trying to prevent the Spanish escape while Stein's BBs fell for the bait of the two slower Spanish ships. Both US Admirals have received praise and decorations for their roles in the defeat of the Spanish. Admiral Stein now heads up the navy where he has used his influence to scrap the four partway constructed monitors started in 1898 and concentrate resources on new battleships. Admiral Mulligan is now in charge of harbor defense in Guam. The position of the remaining commander, the mostly forgotten Admiral Marli, is unknown. Battle of Manila Bay: In this reenactment the Spanish were much more prepared than historically although at a heavy cost in victory points. The cruiser Castilla was repaired and fully mobile whereas historically her engines were defunct, and a hole in her hull was patched with concrete. Minefields of 2 types were upgraded and maintained, as opposed to the historic situation where the minefields were completely ineffective. Finally the 5 fastest Spanish ships were each equipped with a functioning torpedo, also ahistoric. The US was also stronger than historically. Whereas in reality Dewey steamed straight for Manila harbor at the start of the war, in this replay the Americans elected to first reinforce Dewey with 2 Monitors based on the Pacific coast. The disadvantage is that the Spanish therefore had more time to prepare. The US elected to enter Manila Bay at night, as was done historically, so as to avoid shore batteries. They deployed in three columns, 2 of three cruisers each, and a center column of two monitors. Each column then blundered into a minefield, but sadly for the Spanish only two ships were hit: one suffered an insignificant 1 knot loss of speed, the other was a Monitor that lost all movement and was therefore out of the battle. The three columns then entered the battle area. Night reduced visibility to 20-30" as well as creating a -1 modifier to hit. The seven Spanish cruisers successfully ambushed the rightmost US column which was led by the Olympus. Range started at 30" and closed as the action progressed. Unfortunately for the Spanish however the US squadron successfully stayed out of torpedo range, crossed the T several times, and generally danced in a circle around the Spanish. Even had this not been the case the firepower of the three Americans was superior to the seven Spanish, as it was the US ships were hardly scratched before they had sunk four ships and the remaining damaged Spanish vessels elected to scuttle. The other two American columns were deployed too far away for effective mutual support and were only able to contribute a few long-range shots before it was all over. It could have been different. If only the minefields had been more effective. If only the Spanish had been able to spring the ambush from closer range. Or if they had ambushed the weaker of the three columns, rather than the one led by the Olympus. Or if they could have gotten three or four torpedoes off. But as it was they fought desperately and went down in glorious defeat. Spanish Political Situation After the Spanish defeats off of New York and inside Manila Bay the situation looked grim for the Spaniards. The government in Madrid split into contentious factions, although most seemed inclined towards a humiliating peace and surrender of all overseas colonies. However some said that honor was not satisfied while Spain still retained a powerful and expensive home fleet of two Battleships and six armored cruisers. Recently repatriated from Manila the defeated but still defiant Admiral Haggett was treated as a returning hero. The two failed Admirals who made the original campaign plans were nowhere in sight. One has apparently retired in seclusion, the other is busily writing his memoirs and defending his reputation in the world media. Rallied by Admiral Haggett, the Spanish government elected to continue the struggle in a final bid for death or glory. (That would be Haggerts death and/or glory, not theirs personally). The Strategic Situation It took about a month for the Spanish to repair their fleet. During this time both the Philippines and Puerto Rico surrendered to the Americans. Guam was also captured with relative ease as the Spanish defenders were unaware that war had even been declared. At this point the Spanish Atlantic fleet sortied, bombarded the Florida Keys and then fled to Santiago harbor, successfully evading the US fleet. The Americans immediately set up a blockade of the harbor while the Spanish coaled their ships. Meanwhile US and Cuban land forces besieged Santiago from the land side, gradually pushing back the Spanish defenders. The Spanish fleet has no choice but to sortie, it is doomed if it stays in the harbor. The Tactical Situation The American blockading fleet consists of 5 battleships (including the weak coast defense battleship Texas and the powerful modern BB Oregon, which raced around the South American continent from the Pacific coast to join the Atlantic fleet), supported by 4 Monitors. However this is a little misleading as at any given time one battleship and one monitor are likely to be recoaling back in Florida and not available for battle. The Spanish fleet consists of two battleships (including the Carlos V, a second class battleship similar to the Texas), and 6 armored cruisers. They also have the advantage of a number of light guns - strength 3 and under - posted near the entry to the harbor. They suffer from the disadvantage that they must exit the harbor in single file 2" apart. The US has the disadvantage that they don't know which way the Spanish will go, and will probably have to split into two or three separate squadrons a substantial distance apart. Theoretically the Spanish could concentrate their force for a time against a fraction of the US fleet, defeating it in detail. The Spaniards may exit in the day or the night, although at night the American ships keep searchlights trained on the exit from the harbor. The Spanish fleet disposes of 18 heavy guns compared to between 20 and 22 US heavy guns. Hardly impossible odds, especially considering the superior speed of the Spanish fleet. The overconfident American press predicts the complete annihilation of the Spanish fleet with little loss to the US Navy. The Spanish press is less sanguine although proclaiming that death is preferable to disgrace. Representatives of the worlds navies hold their breath, waiting to see if their assorted theories of naval warfare will be vindicated. Battle off of New York Spain opened the war with a raid on New York harbor, shooting up the Statue of Liberty and other targets. The US Atlantic fleet took off in pursuit intercepting the Spanish fleet as it fled back towards home. It is notable that the Spanish battle speed was 20 knots, while the bulk of the US fleet moved 15 knots or less. The Spanish could have avoided battle entirely excepting perhaps a few very long range shots from the US battleships as they withdrew. The Spanish fleet consisted of 8 Armored Cruisers supported by 3 Torpedo Boat Destroyers. The Spanish players at a heavy cost in victory points had twice the historic number of heavy cruisers, as well as having his ships in substantially better repair. The US fleet consisted of 3 battleships, 1 obsolete battleship, 2 armored cruisers, 4 monitors, and the experimental "dynamite" cruiser Vesuvius. This force was 2 monitors and 1 dynamite cruiser over the historic force. The Spanish deployed in two columns of 4 ACs each, with the TBDs sheltering behind one column. The US deployed with a column of 3 BBs followed by 2 ACs, with the DC sheltered to one side, and a second column of monitors with the old BB bringing up the rear. The Spanish initially engaged at long range while the US attempted to close. This meant that the column of monitors fell ever farther behind and that the Spanish could sometimes cross the T of the battleship squadron. Early in the battle the Spanish allowed the opposing battleships to close to around 40" or so, close enough that the speedy DC Vesuvius could make a death ride towards the enemy. Its massive 15" guns scored a lucky hit on the lead enemy cruiser. While this hit reduced the target's speed to 15 knots, return fire blew the Vesuvius to kindling. Still, the success of this experimental weapon meant that at least one Spanish ship would not be able to outdistance the US battleships. It is unclear whether the Spanish strategy was to fire a few shots and disengage, or to take advantage of the separation of the American Battleships from the supporting column of monitors. Perhaps the hull hit and reduced speed on one of the two Spanish flagships decided them on dueling with the battle squadron. At this point the US ACs distanced themselves from the battle. It is worth noting that the US AC armament was relatively ineffective as well as outranged by superior Spanish AC armament. The battle became a duel of 8 ACs vs 3 BBs. The 16 big guns vs 12 big guns would seem to favor the Spanish somewhat, especially since they could manipulate their superior speed to occasionally cross the enemy T. However over time it was the Spanish ships which began to burn and gradually lose their firepower while the Americans kept soaking up the hits without losing primary guns. The climax of the battle was when the battleships managed to get to medium range and began inflicting hull hits on the Spanish, slowing their speed. At the same time the Monitors closed the range and began to get off some long range shots. One Spanish column with perhaps 90% of its firepower gone scattered and ran for it, covered by the other column. The TBDs were sent in on a desperate attack against the American battleship squadron: due to a misunderstanding of signals they instead took off against the obsolete battleship Texas, hitting it with one torpedo before being destroyed. The Texas was reduced to 10 knots. While this was happening the US ACs closed with the remaining Spanish column. The last 4 ACs had been pounded while they covered the other Spanish ships and were now burning and reduced to perhaps 80% firepower. The US cruisers closed so aggressively that the AC New York and the AC Maria Theresa collided; it is unclear to what extent this was intended or accidental. At this point the remaining Spanish rapidly disengaged while the US battleship squadron fired off the last of its ammunition. While the Spanish fleet was wrecked above decks, their hulls and machinery were mostly undamaged and most of the fleet got away. The Americans lacked fast ships for pursuit, both armored cruisers having suffered hull hits and been greatly reduced in speed. Ships sunk are as follows: US AC Brooklyn (foundered while being towed home) US DC Vesuvius (blown to matchsticks after inflicting a single crippling hit) AC Maria Theresa (rammed by AC Brooklyn, slowed and scuttled) AC Cristobal Colon (sunk by the last of the US BB ammunition while trying to withdraw) 3 Spanish TBDs (blown to smithereens in a glorious torpedo attack on the Texas) International Commentary: London: General Blimp, "A clear demonstration of the superiority of English Speaking peoples over the decadent dagos. The remnants of the Spanish Empire are overdue for dismantling." London: Admiral Lord Fisher, "The dominating characteristic of naval warfare is speed, which trumps considerations of guns and armor. The Spanish Navy had the advantage in a fleet of Armored Cruisers, with nearly the firepower of a Battleship but much greater speed; how they threw this all away is beyond imagining..." London: Mr. Jane, "The battle demonstrates the fallacy of attempting to defeat one class of warships, in this case battleships, with a more numerous yet weaker class, in this instance armored cruisers. While the Spanish cruisers are of a fine and powerful design their defeat by a squadron of battleships was predictable, even not accounting for the supporting monitors and cruisers." London: Mr. Courbet, "While most commentators treat the battle as a crushing Spanish defeat, the facts of the matter hardly support this conclusion. Consider that a ship that is not sunk is generally repaired in less than a month, often in a matter of days; therefore only sunk ships are truly significant. Discounting minor warships the Spanish lost 2 armored cruisers and the Americans lost 1 armored cruiser. The principal importance of the battle is not material loss, which was small, but in the psychological effect on the Spanish command." Berlin: Admiral Tirpitz, "The ideal situation is to engage a fraction of the enemy fleet with the totality of your own. The Spanish made a critical error in not combining their two battleships with their cruiser fleet. Even so, using superior maneuver they should have been able to concentrate all eight armor cruisers against the three American battleships while staying out of range of the US monitors. Once the slower half of the US fleet came into action the Spanish were doomed." Moscow: Rear-Admiral Markhorov, "The American commanders demonstrated aggressive tactics in going straight for the enemy fleet, while the Spanish were weak and lacked a clear strategy. American leadership won this battle." Tokyo: Admiral Togo, "The Spanish fleet's mission should be to break the blockade of the Caribbean colonies. It is senseless to risk it except under favorable circumstances, or when there is the possibility of decisive results." Peking: Vice-Admiral Ting, "The Spanish cruisers are armed with a great number of quick-firing secondary guns, as well as an armored ram. Had they closed quickly with the American battleships their upper decks would have been rapidly reduced to a flaming shambles allowing them to be finished off with torpedos and ramming attacks." Washington: Mr. McMahon, "The key to control of the seas is winning a decisive battle vs. the enemy main fleet. All other considerations are secondary. The raid on New York was pointless and counterproductive despite the hysteria in some segments of the American population." Madrid: Admiral Camara: "The actions against the land defences of New York and the American fleet are evidence of Spanish valor and determination to defend itself vs. predatory US ambitions."
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